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Abstract Japanese ODA has attracted much attention in the last three decades. This paper aims 
to shed light on the intellectual evolution of the official discourse on Japanese ODA based on the 
analysis of two main ‘modes of thought’ at the foundation of it, namely national interest and inter-
national affiliation. Based on a detailed content analysis of official documents and public debates, 
the paper will take the role of institutional actors – Japanese political leaders, foreign ministers and 
intellectuals – into consideration. The role of such “entrepreneurs” has been crucial for shaping 
the current official discourse on Japanese foreign aid. The paper will argue, in fact, that the official 
discourse is a juxtaposition of two clashing ideas carefully shaped to enlarge the consensus (both 
domestic and external) toward the Japanese government’s policies.
Summary 1 Introduction. – 2 The Historical Evolution of Japanese ODA and its ‘human turn’ – 
3 Japan’s ODA in the New Millennium: Two Opposed Visions Merged Together. – 4 Conclusion.
Keywords Japanese foreign aid. International development. Ideas. Discourse. Public policy. So-
ciology of knowledge.
1 Introduction
In the last fifty years, Japanese Official development assistance (or Over-
seas Development Assistance, ODA) has undergone several transformations. 
Guiding concepts and philosophies have been transformed too in this pro-
cess of evolution. How have they been integrated in one single discourse? 
The main argument of this paper will be that these changes were the 
result of both external and internal structural factors (i.e., the emergence 
of new dominant philosophies in the field of international development 
and changes in the Government of Japan’s policy priorities). At the same 
time, these changes were brought about because of the action of “intel-
lectual entrepreneurs” (cf. Schmidt 2008) pushing forward their agenda 
born out of a specific social context and supported by a network of in-
dividuals with a certain degree of influence in the policymaking arena. 
These factors have affected the emergence of two ‘modes of thought’, i.e., 
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two manners of interpreting the scope and target of economic cooperation 
(Mannheim 1936). These two ideational ‘poles’ guiding aid-giving within 
the Japanese government are the concept of national interest (kokueki) 
and affiliation with the international community (tsukiai). 
The basic assumption is that “agents and structures are mutually con-
stituted or codetermined entities” (Wendt 1987, 350). In other words, it 
will be argued that the emergence of certain intellectual entrepreneurs 
and their ideas cannot be explained if not in terms of the appearance of 
certain ideas and discourses at a systemic level (i.e., institutional, na-
tional, and international). At the same time, systems exist and reproduce 
because of the actions and interactions of agents (cf. Wendt 1987). 
This paper aims to identify ideational clashes and juxtapositions in 
the official discourse on Japanese ODA, and related relevant actors who 
have contributed to shaping it. Therefore, a corpus of official documents 
and public speeches by these actors has been assembled. This corpus is 
mostly constituted by ministerial statements, policy papers and transcrip-
tions of parliamentary debates. Subsequently, a thematic analysis of the 
collected textual data has been carried out. Themes have been identified 
after several readings revealing of both the superficial and deep contents 
of the texts. In a following phase, the key-themes have been sorted out 
through software-guided labelling and triangulation with the existing 
literature and other relevant official documents.
In the first part of the paper, Japanese ODA will be historically contex-
tualised. Its character as both a humanitarian and a strategic-diplomatic 
policy will be stressed. At the same time, it will be underscored that ODA 
has always represented the interests of diverse stakeholders, both pub-
lic (ministries, implementing agencies) and private (companies), each of 
which with different “horizons of action” (cf. Mori 1995). 
In the second section of the paper, the focus will shift on how the of-
ficial discourse on ODA has evolved since the early 2000s. The role of 
prominent intellectual entrepreneurs will be illustrated. Former JICA 
President Ogata Sadako, former minister of Foreign Affairs Kawaguchi 
Yoriko and current Prime Minister Abe Shinzō were chosen, among 
other Japanese intellectuals and policymakers, as representative of a 
specific mode of thought (either bureaucratic/conservative or liberal/
humanitarian) and of a specific contribution made to the discourse on 
ODA in a specific historical context. Concurrently, their ideas about 
ODA, intended as both cognitive and normative entities (cf. Schmidt 
2008, 307), will be analysed.
In light of these facts, the last part of the paper will provide a discus-
sion of the 2003 and 2015 reviews of Japan’s Charter. Both amendments 
were aimed at promoting a paradigm change in terms of the relationship 
between donor and recipient, advocating for an equal relation rather 
than one of dependence of the latter on the first. But at the same time 
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both reviews have stressed the importance of protecting Japan’s national 
interest while giving aid.1 
2 The Historical Evolution of Japanese ODA  
and its ‘human turn’
Since the early postwar period, ODA has been for Japanese governments 
the most important instrument of foreign policy. First, ODA has been a 
key element of the Japanese nemawashi – “going around the roots” – di-
plomacy, made of quiet and mostly behind-the-scenes negotiations (Hook 
et al. 2013, 80). Especially in the 1990s, members of the international 
community accused the Japanese government of using its ODA merely for 
commercial reasons, giving birth to the expression checkbook diplomacy. 
In the last three decades, scholars of Japanese Official development 
assistance (ODA) have discussed in depth the particularities of the Japa-
nese ODA. Historically, ODA has been subjected to internal and external 
forces (i.e., business interests, foreign diplomacy, and international poli-
tics). In other words, two broad ideas of national interest (kokueki) and 
international affiliation (tsukiai) have come to the fore (Arase 1994, 2005; 
Hasegawa 1975; Hook, Zhang 1998; Mori 1995; Söderberg 1996; Alesina, 
Dollar 2000; Ampiah 1998; Katada 2005; Asplund, Söderberg 2017).2 
From a quantitative point of view, the percentage of Japanese GNI 
(gross national income) allocated to international cooperation has slightly 
changed since 1960, from a maximum 0,34 (1984) to a minimum 0,17 
(2012).3 Figure 1 summarises the historical evolution of Japanes ODA. The 
red-dotted line represents Japan, while the black-dotted line represents 
the average of Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD)-Development Assistance Committee (DAC) countries.
1 Since the Abe administration came to power in late 2012, the Government of Japan (GOJ) 
has promoted a more proactive foreign policy. Representing a conservative political majority, 
the Abe administration has been keen to reassess the importance of the kokueki factor in 
international politics. In addition, facing the emergence of new Asian donors, it has been keen 
on ‘marketing’ the Japanese approach to development. This attempt to reform clearly appears 
from the lexical choice used by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) in Japanese: 
with a 2015 cabinet decision the GOJ has reviewed the 2003 ODA Charter and renamed it 
kokusai kyōryoku taikō (Charter on international cooperation) rather than kokusai kaihatsu 
enjo taikō (literally Charter on international development assistance) (cf. MOFA 2015c).
2 See Hasegawa 1975: The Objectives of Foreign Aid: Japanese Aid for Domestic Prosperity 
and International Ascendency. These two words acquire significance when we consider the 
scope of Japanese ODA in the 1970s.
3 The 2012 data is the lowest excluding the 0,14 percent registered in 1964.
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Figure 1. Japan ODA evolution (1960-2017) (Source: OECD-DAC)
In the 1960s, the allocation of funds to international cooperation gained an 
economic significance.4 The top recipients of Japanese ODA were South-
east Asian countries like Indonesia and Malaysia. Prime Minister Kishi 
Nobusuke viewed ODA as a tool to secure “as many raw materials as pos-
sible, and sell manufactured goods overseas” (Sato 2013, 14).5 
Under the Ikeda administration, in 1964, Japan entered the Organiza-
tion for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) as the first Asian 
country to be accepted in a Euro-American institution. This diplomatic suc-
cess gave Ikeda the possibility to put Japan on a different position in the 
East-Asian frame of political and economic relationships. In those years, 
4 The Japanese effort in international assistance might also be explained in terms of the 
obligation (giri, in Japanese) that the country’s political leadership felt toward the interna-
tional community for the economic assistance received in the early postwar. Upon joining 
the World Bank (WB) in 1952, in fact Japan had received a number of loans to rebuild the 
country’s economic foundations and infrastructures (cf. WB 2016). The country’s policymak-
ers were eager to show the country’s readiness to repay such a debt helping other countries 
in need (cf. Furuoka, Oishi, Kato 2010, § 2.1).
5 The words were pronounced before a Budget committee of the House of Representatives 
in 1960 (cf. Sato 2013).
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the “Flying Geese Paradigm” (gankō keitai) gained popularity.6 In 1967, 
Japan graduated from the WB status of borrower. Assistance policies in 
this early period were centred around loan-based infrastructural aid and 
trade promotion. 
Especially in the mid-1970s, after the conclusion of the Vietnam War, 
Japanese ODA gained a specific strategic significance: with the retreat of 
the US military presence in the region and among the tensions between 
China and Russia for the influence in the area, Japan was tasked with the 
maintenance of peace and stability. Given the constitutional constraints on 
the use of military forces abroad, such a task could be performed mainly 
through diplomatic and economic means (Lam 2013, 164).7
Between the 1970s and the 1980s, through aid loans, the GOJ built a de 
facto yen-based regional economy. On the one hand, this was a concerted 
strategy between Tokyo and Washington of ‘burden sharing’ to stabilise 
Asia and balance the trade deficit the US had accumulated with Japan 
before 1985 (Islam 1991b, 196). 
On the other, until the mid-1980s, yen-loans became a major tool of 
economic advance as the yen appreciated against the dollar after the 
1985 Plaza Accord (Arase 2006, 101). Yen-loans were instrumental in the 
creation of a Japan-led regional financial arrangement based on export-
driven economy (Jessop, Sum 2006a, 190-1). Up until recent years, much 
of Japan’s cooperation fund has been given to recipient countries in form of 
loans. In the GOJ’s rhetoric, loans contribute to the recipient’s ownership 
6 This economic model was described by the Japanese economist Akamatsu Kaname (1962). 
According to it, industrial development was the leading force of economic development. A 
less industrialised country has to import industries and productive methods from other 
more industrialised countries in order to catch up with them on the path of development. 
In the mid 1960s and 1970s, prominent political and academic figures such as the then 
Foreign Minister Okita Saburō and Hitotsubashi University economist Kojima Kiyoshi took 
inspiration from the paradigm to formulate their policies and proposals regarding a new 
and peaceful Asian regional integration.
7 Article 9 of the 1947 Constitution of Japan states as follows: “Aspiring sincerely to an inter-
national peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sover-
eign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. 
In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well 
as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not 
be recognized”. After World War II, Japan virtually renounce to maintain any form of military 
force (cf. Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet (Kantei) 1946-47). This article is currently 
at the centre of the political debate. The current Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) government 
led by PM Abe Shinzō plans to reform Art. 9 in order to allow the SDF to act as a full-fledged 
army. However, it might be argued that Art. 9 was in principle renounced a few years later, in 
1954, when the Japanese Self-Defense Forces were established with the duty of protecting the 
country’s “peace and sovereignty”, preserving the country’s “security”, and, when necessary, 
maintaining the public order. The SDF were also tasked with contributing to the peace and 
security of the international community within the activities of the United Nations (Jieitai hō, 
Shōwa 29 [1954], June 9, Law No. 165; URL http://elaws.e-gov.go.jp/search/elawsSearch/
elaws_search/lsg0500/detail?lawId=329AC0000000165&openerCode=1 [2018-06-12]).
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of the development projects, to the recipient’s self-help effort (jijo doryoku) 
and autonomy (jishusei), and to the promotion of South-South cooperation 
(Katō 1980; King, McGrath 2004; Sasuga 2007). However, this situation 
undeniably favoured Japanese businesses striving to secure supplies of 
raw materials and markets for their products and services.
The private sector had a major stake in ODA. Until the late 1990s, most 
of Japanese ODA loans were in fact tied, that is to be used on procurements 
to Japanese companies (Katada 2005, 6). Arase (1994) analyses the coor-
dination between business federations, such as Keidanren, and economic 
ministries, such as the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), 
now the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI); and agencies, 
such as the Economic Planning Agency (EPA, now part of METI) in aid-
giving. He maintains that these actors favoured a “reorientation” of Japa-
nese ODA since the mid-1980s: in the context of rising production costs 
in Japan, manufacturers started looking for opportunities of investment 
in developing countries (where wages and production costs were lower) 
in order to keep their competitiveness (Arase 1994, 172-3). 
In this context, in 1989, Japan emerged as the world’s top donor. The 
Japanese mercantilist approach to development assistance and the low 
ratio of ODA against GDP (0.2 against the fixed rate of 0.7 %) became the 
object of criticism from the international community and particularly from 
the US. Japan was accused of being an international “free rider” profiting 
from Washington’s military protection to recreate a co-prosperity sphere 
in Asia by means of foreign aid (Islam 1993, 321-2). 
The GOJ’s practices as a donor however came under scrutiny in the early 
1990s. In that period, the poor results of neoliberal programs based on 
market reforms and structural adjustment implemented by IFIs in order to 
curb poverty in the Third World were evident (cf. Ferguson 1990). A new 
paradigm of “inclusive neoliberalism” emerged, based on “social policy, 
infrastructure, governance reforms and conflict management” along with 
the traditional focus on growth and privatizations (Hickey 2012, 683-4). 
Within the United Nations a new view of development emerged. In 1990, 
the United Nations Development Program published its first Human Devel-
opment Report stressing the importance of a paradigmatic change in inter-
national development policies (UNDP 1990, 1). Development needed to be 
seen not exclusively in terms of GNP growth or capital accumulation. The 
new vision stressed the importance of expanding the range of “choices” and 
improving “human capabilities” in education and health (UNDP 1990, 3). 
In this new climate, the GOJ established its view of development. Criti-
cising WB and IMF (International Monetary Fund) policies, in 1991 the 
Office Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF) – a division of the 
Minister of Finance – published an occasional paper critical of the IMF 
and WB’s policies and called for a reevaluation of the role of the state 
in a country’s economic development (Katada 2005; Wade 1996). One of 
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the reasons leading to such a reform, was the fear of economic instability 
spreading outside the formerly socialist bloc. In fact, the fall of the Soviet 
Union required an action by the rest of the international community toward 
integration of the formerly collectivist economies in the global neo-liberal 
economy (Craig, Porter 2004, 64). 
A new form of development assistance based not only on economic trans-
fers, but on the transfer of knowledge, know-how, and institutional arrange-
ments, took form at the international society’s level and Japan adapted 
to it. “Peer pressure” by other OECD countries eventually led the GOJ to 
conform to other donor’s practices and multilateral institutions guidelines 
and curb the image of Japanese diplomacy as based only on mercantilist 
considerations (Katada 2005, 7).8 In response to such criticism, in 1992 
the GOJ approved a series of regulations on ODA, the ODA Charter (MOFA 
2003a). The document was conceived by the GOJ in order to improve Ja-
pan’s image in the donors’ community promoting regularity and transpar-
ency (Arase 1994, 195). In addition, the document stressed the importance 
of human rights, basic freedoms, and environmental conservation. Howev-
er, the 1992 ODA Charter did not have a relevant impact on the overall aid 
allocation process which lacked coherence, transparency, accountability, 
and efficiency (Kawai, Takagi 2001, 13; Arase 2005, 271). Moreover, even if 
enshrined in the Charter, the provision of “software aid” was burdened with 
the lack of preparedness of Japanese development officials and by the rigid 
bureaucratic structure of the GOJ’s aid sector (Fujisaki et al. 1997, 538).
Even after the 2008 reform of the Japanese International Cooperation 
Agency (JICA), now the only ODA implementing agency, and other reforms 
inside the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), Japan’s ODA has been in 
fact a highly institutionalised and bureaucratised process involving slightly 
less than a dozen ministries and agencies. As stressed by Mori (1995), the 
result of this institutionalisation and bureaucratisation of ODA has been 
the subjugation of policymaking, of which the MOFA is in charge, to the 
different “horizons of action” of other actors involved and to the power 
relations in place among them (Mori 1995, 10).9
8 In retrospect, such criticism against Japan was only partially justified: the US, for in-
stance, were giving nearly double the tied aid that Japan gave to its recipients. Japan’s ratio of 
tied aid in the 1980s was also under the DAC average (Islam 1993, 345). In addition, in 1990, 
Japan allocated to foreign aid the equivalent of the 0,3% of its GNP against the 0,19 of the US. 
Furthermore, the percentage of grant aid (0,27) was also higher than that of the US (0,19).
9 On the one hand, the MOFA has acted to uniform its ODA to the international standards 
set by international organisation such as OECD; on the other, he saw in institutional actors 
such as the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) and the Ministry of Finance 
(MOF) two more conservative forces: the first trying to lobby lawmakers for a more strategic 
use of international cooperation apt to serve Japanese companies’ interests abroad; the lat-
ter, acting as the ‘control tower’ of the country’s economic policy, pulling the ‘brakes’ on a 
possible uncontrolled expansion of ODA budgets (cf. Pempel 1982; Shimizu 2015).
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In the mid-1990s, the GOJ was urged by experts in Japan and outside to 
make its ODA process more transparent and more ‘humanitarian’ in scope. 
In addition, internal scandals involving MOFA bureaucrats, and interna-
tional events as the September 11, 2001 attacks in New York contributed 
to the reshaping of Japanese foreign aid. The case of misappropriation 
of ODA funds by an LDP lawmaker, and allegations of development co-
operation funds misuse in the early 2002 spurred further reform in the 
Ministry, and in the overall GOJ’s aid policies, leading to drastic budget 
cuts to Japan’s development assistance (cf. Arase 2005, 271; Hatakeyama, 
Freedman 2010, 354; Jain 2014).
The 2011 Tohoku earthquake and tsunami caused a drop in the GOJ’s 
allocations to ODA. Under the Abe government the ratio of ODA/GNI has 
returned on a growing trend given the renovated importance attached to 
this policy by the LDP administration. In 2015, the Japanese government 
approved a Charter revision (MOFA 2015c), allowing the allocation of ODA 
funds to security-related areas, previously not included in the framework 
of international cooperation (see infra).
3 Japan’s ODA in the New Millennium:  
Two Opposed Visions Merged Together
After giving an overview of the historical evolution of Japan’s ODA since 
the early postwar, in this section, the two guiding principles of ODA poli-
cymaking in Japan will be discussed in further detail. The scope of this 
paper is in fact not only to present the evolution of the guiding modes of 
thought in Japanese ODA with regards to facts that might be identified as 
structural (for instance, changes in the larger international context). The 
role of certain individuals, that, drawing upon Schmidt (2008) might be 
described as intellectual entrepreneurs. These are defined as “catalysts for 
change as they draw on and articulate the ideas of discursive communities 
and coalitions” (Scmidt 2008, 310). 
Naturally, a comprehensive discussion of all those who have contrib-
uted to the discursive and intellectual evolution of the Japanese ODA is 
not possible here. For the scope of this research the analysis will focus 
on the evolution of the discourse on Japanese ODA since the early 2000s 
until 2015. Therefore, three representative figures will be analysed: 
namely, former JICA president Ogata Sadako, former Foreign Minister 
Kawaguchi Yuriko, current Prime Minister Abe Shinzō and former For-
eign Minister Kishida Fumio. 
The former, notably two women, were the most important actors behind 
the first ODA sector reform initiated in the early 2000s after a series of 
bribery and corruption scandals. Ogata, former special envoy to the United 
Nations (UN) can be considered one of the strongest advocates in Japan of 
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a liberal/humanitarian and internationalised idea of human-centred foreign 
aid. Abe and Kishida can be instead identified with the raison d’état guid-
ing ODA policymaking in Japan. Both were and are high ranking members 
of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), the major conservative force in 
contemporary Japanese politics. The analysis of these individuals’ position 
in the context of the ODA discourse will lead then to consider how different 
and sometimes conflicting modes of thought can be integrated and provide 
the intellectual basis for the official discourse on ODA.
3.1 Ogata Sadako and the Alignment of Japanese Aid
The revision of the ODA Charter (MOFA 2015c), on the one hand, reflected 
the peer pressure from the OECD/DAC donors’ community favouring an 
expansion of Japanese ODA to geographical areas other than Asia where 
Japanese interests were limited (Katada 2005, 7). On the other, roughly 
coincided the end of Japan as number one in foreign aid. 
The 2003 Charter’s ‘vision’, which brought together global (the fight 
against global poverty, and terrorism, the need for good governance, etc.) 
and national concerns (accountability, transparence), was a natural conse-
quence of the scandals involving the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), and 
the ODA bureaucracy which led to the sacking of the then Foreign Minister 
Tanaka Makiko by Prime Minister Koizumi Jun’ichirō.10
The year 2003 was a crucial moment for the evolution of the Japanese 
“aid philosophy”. An important role was played by Former UNHCR Com-
missioner Ogata Sadako. Ogata, a US-educated official, became the agen-
cy’s president in October 2003 after an extensive experience at the UN.11 
10 For a more detailed account of the Suzuki scandal, cf. Berkofsky 2002, Jain 2014 and 
Hara 2008.
11 After her studies in English Literature at the University of the Sacred Heart in Tokyo, 
Ogata got an M.A. in International Relations at Georgetown University in 1953, and 10 years 
after, a Ph.D. in Political Science at Berkeley University. She entered the UN in the late 1970’s 
when she was appointed Minister at the Japanese Mission at the UN and afterwards she 
was Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary at the Permanent Mission of Japan 
to the UN. In the 1980s she was appointed as Representative of Japan on the UN Commis-
sion on Human Rights, and worked as Human Rights expert on Myanmar. She also served 
in the UNICEF executive board. Ogata served as UN High Commissioner for Refugees from 
1991 to 2000. She is the only woman ever to hold the post. In 2001, she was elected Co-
chair of the Commission on Human Security along with Indian economist and Nobel Prize 
Amartya Sen. In the same year, Ogata was appointed by the GOJ as special representative 
of the Prime Minister of Japan on Afghanistan Assistance. She also made contributions in 
academia, as Associate Professor of International Relations at the International Christian 
University, University of the Sacred Heart, and Sophia University in Tokyo. In the 1980’s she 
served as Dean of the Faculty of Foreign Studies at Sophia University. See the Biography 
of Mrs. Sadako Ogata at http://www.un.org/News/dh/hlpanel/ogata-bio.htm (2018-06-12).
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The new president promoted a new approach to development assistance, 
based, among the others, on the concept of human security. At the same 
time, Ogata sponsored a rationalisation of the Japanese international aid 
sector. The guiding principles of her presidency were put forward in her 
2003 inaugural address: more attention was to be given to the gemba, 
the field of action for aid practitioners, i.e., the recipient country and its 
population.
In this occasion, JICA will radically revise its organisation and tasks 
in order to respond to the Japanese people’s expectations and to deal 
rapidly with the needs of the developing countries on common issues 
affecting the international community. Concretely, with the promotion 
of a radical change in our officials’ awareness of their work, we will 
promote a reform focusing on the four pillars of result-oriented action 
and efficiency; transparency and accountability; people’s participation 
and peacebuilding. Our work will be founded on a recipient-centred 
approach [gembashugi]: we will as always prioritize the necessities 
[kankaku, lit. “perceptions”] of those on the field [gemba], and their 
voices will be reflected in our action [gemba no koe]. At the same 
time, we will contribute to the social and economic development of 
developing countries including in our action the philosophy of human 
security which focuses on societies and peoples. (Ogata 2003; Author’s 
translation)
JICA は、この機会に、より国民の期待に応え、国際社会の共通の課題や途上国
のニーズに迅速に対応できるよう、これまでの組織・業務のあり方を抜本的 に見
直します。具体的には、職員の意識改革を行い、成果重視・効率性、透明性・説
明責任、国民参加、及び平和構築支援の4つの柱に重点を置いた改革を進めてまい
ります。仕事では「現場主義」を基本とし、常に現場の感覚を大切にし、現場の
声を反映しながら事業を運営するとともに、社会や国民に焦点を当てた「人間の
安全保障」の考え方を踏まえて、途上国の社会経済の発展に貢献してまいります
In much the same spirit, in a 2006 speech, Ogata announced a JICA 
reorganisation that would take effect in 2008, expressing her convic-
tion that the new organisational structure and tasks, resulting from the 
merger of the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC)’s overseas 
operations division into JICA, could improve Japanese aid giving on a 
global level. 
According to Ogata,
Our world is increasingly interlinked. Borders are no longer barriers to 
transnational crime, terrorism, or even diseases such as SARS. In such 
an environment, ODA is more important than ever. Assisting developing 
and poor countries are requirements for building a prosperous global 
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community […]. More comprehensive planning will be possible through 
simplified and quick decision making […] This, in turn, will result in a 
more integrated and efficient foreign assistance program that can better 
address the needs of developing nations. (JICA 2006)
On the other hand, domestic dynamics were also decisive in shaping a new 
ODA framework in Japan. As Mori (1995) argues, different ministerial ac-
tors are involved in drafting the GOJ’s aid policies.
3.2 Kawaguchi Yoriko and the Reappraisal of “national interest”  
in Japan’s Foreign Aid
The 2003 ODA Charter was supervised by Foreign Minister Kawaguchi 
Yoriko.12 An US-educated former WB economist and Ministry of Interna-
tional Trade and Industry official, Kawaguchi took over the post at the head 
of MOFA the previous year at the end of a troubled period for Japanese 
diplomacy discredited by a series of scandals in the early 2000s. Given her 
position as successor to the scandal-hit Tanaka Makiko, her approach to 
international cooperation, and foreign affairs in general, had to be more 
bureaucratic and practical. Moreover, as a career government official and 
member of the dominant Liberal-democratic Party, her approach had to be 
consistent with the government’s: with the statements hereby analysed, 
she appears to counterbalance the prevalently humanitarian vision of the 
newly elected JICA president.
As the newly appointed Minister argued during a question time in the 
National Diet, one of the greatest result the Japanese post-war diplomacy 
has achieved is Japanese ‘independence’. This has yielded positive results 
for the international community and for Japan itself. In turn, Japan has 
been able to choose its path toward the realisation of its “national inter-
est” being identified with Japan’s own peace and prosperity. One way has 
been to forge an alliance with the US; the other to harmonise its policies 
with that of the (Euro-American) international community. Both elements 
have contributed sensibly to Japan’s recovery and economic growth after 
World War II. These two pillars of Japanese foreign policy have also al-
lowed Japan to proactively make its contribution on a global scale. In fact, 
It is crucial that the world is peaceful and develops consequently, for 
Japan has a national interest in the fact that the world is peaceful, secure 
and developed, just for being dependent on other countries. For this 
12 Kawaguchi is a long-serving LDP official in charge of environmental issues and foreign 
affairs. She is also an academic: she holds a professorship at the Meiji Institute for Global 
Affairs and serves as an Executive Advisor to the Sasakawa Foundation Peace Foundation.
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reason, its cooperation with the international community is extremely 
important.13
日本は世界が平和であって、安全、発展をしているということに日本の国益を持
っている国であるわけでございますから、それだけ日本は世界のほかの国々に依
存をしているわけでして、世界が平和であって発展をしていくということが重要
である。そのために、日本は国際協調ということを非常に重要なこととして考え
ているわけです.
Against this background, Minister Kawaguchi went on asserting the neces-
sity of an unprecedented endeavour by the Japanese diplomacy in order 
to secure a stable, peaceful and prosperous global order. On the one hand 
Japan needed to further strengthen its cooperation with neighbouring 
countries, such as those in Southeast Asia. Then, it needed to remain en-
gaged in different peace-building initiatives in Asia, such as in Sri Lanka, 
East Timor and Afghanistan, making its contribution to the peace process. 
According to Foreign Minister Kawaguchi, Japan also needed to cooperate 
with other international partners on issues like the nuclear non-prolifera-
tion, with regards to North Korea and Iran. 
Furthermore, Japan needed also to take the lead in revitalising Iraq after 
the 2003 US military campaign. According to Kawaguchi, foreign policy 
is an integral part of the culture and mentality of country that produces 
it. A good result is achieved when diplomacy is capable to enhance, and, 
at the same time, been enhanced by, feelings of “pride” and “belonging” 
in fellow countrymen.
[…] I agree that diplomacy and the Japanese psyche are two connected 
factors. I already said that the protection of peace and prosperity is part 
of the national interest. The encouragement and pride toward Japan of 
the Japanese people is in fact one component supporting and sustaining 
diplomacy. At the same time, they are the product of a good diplomacy. 
I believe that this does not concern exclusively diplomacy. The life-style 
of each one of us, our education, our personal security, the pride for our 
culture: in other words, these are all factors that combined will build 
up a sense of self-esteem and self-respect in the Japanese people. This 
is the spirit that guide our foreign policy and is its driving force. The 
results of a good policy ought to be found in that relation and it needs 
to be further promoted.14
13 See 159th Diet Session, House of Representatives, Foreign Affairs Commission, 6th 
meeting, March 12, 2004, 37/141.
14 See 159th Diet Session, House of Representatives, Foreign Affairs Commission, 6th 
meeting, March 12, 2004, 87/141. Author’s translation.
Zappa. Help the Poor, Help Ourselves 419
Annali di Ca’ Foscari. Serie orientale, 54, 2018, 407-432
e-ISSN 2385-3042 
ISSN 1125-3789
外交が日本の精神とかかわっていくものであるというのは全くそのとおりだと思
います。平和と繁栄の確保が国益であるというふうに申し上げましたけれども、
日本人精神の高揚あるいは日本人の国に対しての誇りといったようなもの、これ
は一つは外交を支持するもの、サポートするものであると思いますし、同時に、
いい外交の結果生まれるものでもあるというふうに思います。それからまた、こ
れは外交だけとかかわり合いを持っているわけではない、一人一人の生き方、教
育ですとか生活の安定ですとか、あるいは文化に対する誇りですとか、そういっ
たようないろいろなこと全部が合わさって、我が国の要するに日本人の自信ある
いは自尊心、そういったことをつくり上げていくということで、それが外交の背
景にあって外交をサポートするものであるというふうに私は思います。そしてま
た、いい外交の結果、それがさらにはぐくまれる、そういった関係にあるという
ふうに私は考えております.
3.3 The 2003 ODA Charter as a Juxtaposition of “modes of thought”
The cabinet decision revising the ODA Charter recognised the GOJ’s en-
deavour side by side with the international community in tackling global is-
sues, such as poverty, human security, conflict prevention, and new global 
‘threats’ such as terrorism. The document recognised that in tackling these 
issues, ODA could guarantee a “benefit” (rieki) to Japan as well, specifi-
cally in forging positive diplomatic and economic relations. In fact,
As one of the world’s major actors, Japan is determined to use proac-
tively its ODA to take measures to solve these issues. Tackling these 
issues would benefit our country too, in different ways, broadly speak-
ing, increasing friendly relationships and exchanges with every coun-
try, and strengthening our role in the international arena. In addition, 
Japan, which is highly dependent on foreign countries for the supply 
of raw materials, energy and food, will enjoy the favor of interna-
tional trade while deepening its relation of mutual dependency with 
its recipients, and will contribute proactively to their security and 
development through its ODA. For Japan, which aspires to peace, mak-
ing the Japanese presence felt both domestically and internationally 
proactively tackling these issues through ODA, is the most suitable 
policy to gain the sympathy of the international community. Therefore, 
from now on ODA should play an always greater role. (MOFA 2003b; 
Author’s transl.)
我が国は、世界の主要国の一つとして、ODAを積極的に活用し、これらの問題に
率先して取り組む決意である。こうした取組は、ひいては各国との友好関係や人
の交流の増進、国際場裡における我が国の立場の強化など、我が国自身にも様々
な形で利益をもたらすものである。さらに、相互依存関係が深まる中で、国際貿
易の恩恵を享受し、資源・エネルギー、食料などを海外に大きく依存する我が国
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としては、ODAを通じて開発途上国の安定と発展に積極的に貢献する。このこと
は、我が国の安全と繁栄を確保し、国民の利益を増進することに深く結びついて
いる。特に我が国と密接な関係を有するアジア諸国との経済的な連携、様々な交
流の活発化を図ることは不可欠である。平和を希求する我が国にとって、ODAを通
じてこれらの取組を積極的に展開し、我が国の姿勢を内外に示していくことは、
国際社会の共感を得られる最もふさわしい政策であり、ODAは今後とも大きな役割
を担っていくべきである。
Aiming at their resolution, the GOJ identified the following guidelines:
1. Self-help (jijo doryoku): ODA should be aimed at fostering good 
governance, developing human resources, a legal system, and the 
foundation of an economic system, respecting the recipient’s ‘own-
ership’ of the development process and its specific growth strategy.
2. Human security: ODA should be aimed at cooperating with devel-
oping countries in preventing conflicts, natural disasters, and epi-
demics, empowering local communities through human resource 
development. Not only this would contribute to the protection of 
individuals, but it would also make them strengthen their abilities 
to respond to such crises.
3. Equality: ODA should take into account the situation of the poor 
and the powerless and tackle income inequalities on a local base. 
Specifically, its initiatives should improve women’s participation in 
their societies.
4. Export of Japanese experience and expertise: ODA should be based 
on the Japanese development experience. In other words, Japanese 
high-level technologies, know-hows, and high-skilled human resourc-
es must be deployed in accordance to the requests of the recipient.
5. Harmony with the international community: GOJ’s ODA should be 
harmonised with the development goals set by the major interna-
tional organisations. Cooperation must be sought with other sub-
jects as NGOs and private enterprises (MOFA 2003a).
As a result, a new ODA vision emerged. On the one hand, it reflected 
an international discourse on human development, human security and 
empowerment that had been promoted by the United Nations since the 
early 1990s, and by the WB in the late 1990s. On the other, even if not 
too explicitly, the MOFA recognised the importance to preserve national 
interest in its foreign policy (kokueki).
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3.4 The Abe Administration and Its “proactive” Approach to Foreign Aid: 
the 2015 Revision of the Charter
In February 2015, the Abe administration provided a new revision of the 
document regulating Japan’s international cooperation (MOFA 2015a). 
The decision was taken by the government in the broader context of the 
“proactive contribution to peace” launched by the Abe administration in 
2013. Since the inception of its second mandate as prime minister, Abe 
has pledged to reinvigorate the country’s foreign policy, which, according 
to the LDP leader, was frustrated under the DPJ (Abe 2013a, 246). In his 
essay “For a Beautiful Country”, citing the example of Yokota Megumi, 
a Japanese girl abducted to North Korea in 1977, Abe denounces the in-
ability of the Japanese post-war system to protect its own citizens against 
foreign threats (Abe 2013a, 252-3). Abe hints at the article 9 of the 1947 
constitution, which bars Japan from having a full-fledged army. Even if he 
does not specifically refer to Japanese international cooperation, the spirit 
of Abe’s words indicated a stronger focus on security issues in comparison 
with previous administrations. 
The cabinet’s policy paper underscores the role of ODA in securing 
Japan’s peace and security. In addition, it stresses the importance of an 
“evolution” of the policy in order for Japan to become an equal partner 
of developing countries and to help the international community to solve 
important issues. One of the most apparent feature of the new cabinet 
decision is the shift from the use of the expression kaihatsu enjo (literar-
ily: aid for development) to kaihatsu kyōryoku (literarily: cooperation for 
development).15
Though the wording of the 2015 cabinet decision on ODA puts great 
emphasis on the needs of the recipient countries in terms of economic and 
social development, human security, good governance and democracy, as 
in the previous revision, the national interest aspects are evident. In the 
premises of the document it is stated that international cooperation with 
both prominent members of the international community and developing 
countries is “essential” for Japan in order to “secure its national interests”. 
Further, the document reads:
Japan will promote development cooperation in order to contribute more 
proactively to the peace, stability and prosperity of the international 
community. Such cooperation will also lead to ensuring Japan’s national 
15 In fact, this is not a new feature of the GOJ’s discourse on ODA. As Jain (2014) maintains, 
the emphasis on ‘cooperation’ rather than on ‘assistance’ has been relevant since 1980s in 
the Japanese aid discourse and it may indicate a sort of “reciprocity” of the donor-recipient 
relations. However, the GOJ’s decision to change the name of the policy might indicate a 
further ideational and discursive shift toward presenting donor-recipient relations as equal.
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interests such as maintaining its peace and security, achieving further 
prosperity, realizing an international environment that provides stabil-
ity, transparency and predictability, and maintaining and protecting an 
international order based on universal values. (MOFA 2015a, 3)
The reason for such an emphasis is to be found in the recognition by Japa-
nese policymakers that the international system has undergone profound 
changes in the last two decades. Interdependency among national econo-
mies, technological innovation and growing influence of supranational 
non-state actors play a fundamental role in today’s international system. 
At the same time, risks and threats have multiplied. 
Environmental issues, natural disasters, food shortages and famines, en-
ergy issues, infectious diseases, international terrorism, organised crime, 
and piracy, political instability, economic crises, ethnic divisions and civil 
wars – especially whether they have a regional configuration –, are in-
creasingly transboundary phenomena: they might originate in one country 
but can affect other countries if not the entire international community. 
In this situation, no country, reads the document, can defend itself on its 
own against such global threats and challenges.
Therefore, the most important challenge for Japan is to provide assis-
tance in order to secure the building of “stable foundations” for develop-
ment in the recipient countries. That is, contributing to a) peace building; 
b) to the implementation of the rule of law; c) to the creation of a trans-
parent, accountable and inclusive governance; d) to democratisation and 
reduction of the gender gap; and d) to the construction and management 
of a solid economic infrastructure (MOFA 2015a, 2). This view is consist-
ent with the ODA guiding principle of jijo doryoku, or self-help. However, 
the most relevant aspect of the revised Chapter is its recognition of ODA 
in the security and para-military areas.
Japan will also provide assistance to enhance capacities in developing 
countries such as: the capacity of law enforcement authorities including 
capabilities to ensure maritime safety; the capacity of security authori-
ties including capabilities to combat terrorism and transnational organ-
ized crime including drug trafficking and trafficking in persons; and the 
capacity of developing countries in relation to global commons such as 
seas, outer space, and cyberspace. (MOFA 2015a)
Before 2015, specific security issues were not included in the ODA Charter. 
Under the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) government (2009-2012), for-
eign aid was considered instrumental to realising “peace and prosperity” 
across the globe and to “living in harmony” with the international society 
(Ohno 2013, 78-9). This principle was reflected in the attempt by the DPJ 
government to get NGOs, private business and the general public more 
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involved in international cooperation and in the decision-making process. 
Though maintaining a generally liberal-humanitarian approach to inter-
national cooperation, in the 2009 ODA Review, the DPJ also affirmed the 
importance of preserving Japan’s “national interest”, that, however, had 
to be “enlightened” (78-9). 
However, the vision of the national interest emerging in the 2015 Cabi-
net decision on the Development Cooperation Charter is based on a defini-
tion established in 2013 by the GOJ. According to the definition offered by 
the cabinet secretariat (CAS) in 2013, Japanese national interest is
To protect Japan’s national sovereignty, its territorial autonomy, the 
protection of Japanese citizens’ livelihoods and assets, the support of 
national culture and traditions and the maintenance of the country’s 
peace and security. […] It is to realize the prosperity of the nation and 
its people through the strengthening of free trade towards the creation 
of a stable, transparent and sustainable international environment. (CAS 
2013; Author’s translation)
Lastly, national interest relates to
the universal values of respect for freedom, democracy, rule of law and 
the maintenance and protection of an international system based on 
[international] rules. (CAS 2013; Author’s translation)
In other words, GOJ policymakers seem to see national interest and inter-
national (or worldwide) interest as two mutually dependent concepts. This 
principle is further elaborated in the 2015 Diplomatic Bluebook. It is in 
the mutual interest of Japan and the international community to work on 
common “interests” such as maintaining security, peacekeeping and peace 
building in former war zones (for instance, through an enhanced participa-
tion of Japanese troops in international missions); fighting international 
terrorism (for example, the Islamic State); working on disarmament and 
nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, strengthening the role of the United 
Nations; promoting the rule of law, in order to facilitate the settlement of 
disputes; promoting human rights and women inclusion in societies around 
the world (cf. MOFA 2015b, 175-8).16
Another important feature of the 2015 document is the emphasis on the 
promotion of “quality growth”. As mentioned above, the GOJ aims at build-
ing through aid the economic and institutional foundations of economic 
growth in developing countries. In order to provide a kind of aid that fits 
16 See MOFA 2015b, ch. 3 “Japan’s Foreign Policy to Promote National and Worldwide 
Interests”. http://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000106463.pdf (2018-06-12).
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into this category, the Cabinet decision underscores three broad guiding 
principles, drawn upon Japan’s own experience in the post-war reconstruc-
tion: inclusiveness, sustainability and resilience.
In order to resolve the poverty issue in a sustainable manner, it is es-
sential to achieve economic growth through human resources develop-
ment, infrastructure development and establishment of regulations and 
institutions as well as the growth of the private sector enabled by the 
aforementioned actions, which are aimed at a self-reliant growth of devel-
oping countries. However, such growth should not be merely quantitative 
in nature, given that some of the countries that have achieved a measure 
of economic growth face challenges such as widening disparities, sustain-
ability issues, inadequate social development, and political and economic 
instability. Rather, it should be “quality growth”. Such growth is inclusive 
in that the fruits of growth are shared within society as a whole, leaving 
no one behind. It is
sustainable over generations in terms of consideration to, among oth-
er aspects, harmony with the environment, sustained socioeconomic 
growth, and addressing global warming. And it is resilient, able to with-
stand and recover from economic crises, natural disasters and other 
shocks. These are some of the challenges Japan has tackled in its post-
war history. Japan will take advantage of its own experience, expertise 
and technology as well as lessons learned in order to provide assis-
tance to realize “quality growth” and poverty eradication through such 
growth. (MOFA 2015a, 5)
The Cabinet decision underlines security issues that were not included 
in the 2003 Charter revision. In order for the recipient countries to “help 
themselves”, in fact, developing countries should be able to preserve their 
nation’s peace and security. These are in turn considered the “prereq-
uisites for nation-building and development” (MOFA 2015a, 6). For this 
reason, Japan intends to take steps to enhance its developing partners’ 
law enforcement and surveillance capabilities, particularly with regards 
to maritime security. In other words, the 2015 Cabinet decision allows the 
GOJ to provide aid for basically military purposes (McGrath 2015; Jain 
2016). In conclusion, since 2015, it has been clear that the GOJ foreign 
aid ideational framework has been framed on the basis of the idea of the 
“Proactive Contribution”. This is presented in official documents as a duty 
that Japan has facing the expectations of the international community 
which, in turn, has given Japan “respect and confidence” (MOFA 2015a, 
3). In other words, pledging an increased effort in the international arena, 
the GOJ seems to be looking for a “legitimation” of its possible new role 
from the international community.
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3.5 Quality Aid for Quality Growth
The discourse on “quality growth” resonates with the one of “quality aid” 
which has been discussed by the country’s scholars and experts and pro-
moted by Prime Minister Abe Shinzō since his comeback to power in late 
2012. For example, Kurosaki and Ōtsuka (2015) have underlined the necest-
sity for Japan to achieve a transition toward “quality” in aid. Japan does 
not need to retain its position as a “big donor”, rather, it has to become 
a model of “smart donor” exporting its know-how, technical assistance 
and technology accordingly to the needs of the recipient countries. The 
basic argument of many of the articles collected in the edited book is that 
in the twenty-first century, Japan will not be able to get back to the top 
of the world’s largest donor. The US primacy appears to be unreachable. 
However, Japan might still have a say in the global development industry 
exerting a sort of intellectual leadership drawing upon its own experience 
as a developing country in the immediate postwar.
This point was already developed in 2005 by the then Japanese Foreign 
Minister Asō Tarō who defined Japan a “trailblazer” and therefore a model 
for emerging Asian countries (Asō 2005).
At the 21st International Conference on the Future of Asia in May 2015 
that Japan will continue to pursue its aim of making “all-out efforts” for 
the peace and prosperity in Asia reminding the audience of the crucial 
role of Japanese assistance to Asia since the 1950s. On the one hand, Abe 
pledged a more proactive role in Asia, including in security matters, im-
plicitly recognising possible threats to the peace and stability of the region. 
On the other, Japan’s Prime Minister pointed at the importance of the 
country’s outward economic strategy, reassessing its position as a regional 
donor and a leading economy since the early postwar period. In his ad-
dress, Prime Minister Abe stressed a change of paradigm in Asia-Japan 
relations. The Japanese leader in fact admitted that Asia was “no longer a 
recipient of assistance”, rather a “partner for growth” (Abe 2015). How-
ever, in Abe’s words, Japan seems to retain a privileged position. His invi-
tation to the audience – head of states and political and business leaders 
from East and Southeast Asia – to “be innovative” appears to be a call to 
embrace the Japanese model and learn the Japanese lesson. 
What appears clear is that Prime Minister Abe tries to depict a Japanese-
influenced “way of operation” that might lead to solving emerging prob-
lems in Asian countries.
We now stand at a historical crossroads. What future awaits us beyond 
Asian growth? Unfortunately, it will not necessarily be only good news. 
Failure to meet the continuously expanding demand for energy will put 
the brakes on our high rate of growth. And even in Asia, the wave of a 
graying population is about to surge. As a result, Asia must be innova-
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tive. We must use innovation to confront the issues that lie in store for 
us. […]. Whether a blessing or a curse, Japan has grappled with the 
problem of energy constraints for many years as an island nation hav-
ing only scarce resources. Having begun to face the issue of an aging 
population quite early on, we have also improved our medical services. 
Japan intends to share those technologies and experiences openhand-
edly with other Asian nations. Moreover, I would like to bring about 
further innovation by working together, through the amalgamation of 
young minds from around Asia. (Abe 2015)
Cooperation between Japan and Asia is seen as the way to pursue new 
economic growth based on innovation and quality. Further in his address, 
Prime Minister Abe might be suggesting that quality growth can be pos-
sible also with “quality aid” from Japan. In its concluding part, Prime Min-
ister Abe’s address could also be interpreted as a form of “advertisement” 
for Japanese aid being praised as a “quality creator” wherever it had been 
allocated (Abe 2015).
Creating quality. That is the Japanese way of operating. More than half a 
century ago, in Indonesia, there was a project to prevent flooding, to tap 
water for agricultural land, and create electricity through hydropower. 
Japan supported the development of the Brantas river for more than 30 
years. […] Assistance from Japan is not one-sided. The Japanese live under 
the same roof as the local engineers, and they think and move forward 
together. Rather than simply bringing Japan’s technologies into a country, 
we foster the people there and make the technologies well-established. 
This is how Japan operates. […]. Asia, with its ongoing dynamic growth, 
is no longer a recipient of assistance. It is instead our partner for growth. 
In this Asia, it is also a partner generating innovation. That’s exactly why 
I believe that the Japanese way of operation is now much more suited to 
the Asian countries than ever. We create quality. And we think together 
and move forward together with the people of Asia. (Abe 2015)
In his address, PM Abe has underscored the fact that Japanese aid has 
had a crucial role in promoting innovation across the Asian continent. 
This innovation has also been applied in order to reduce the risk of natu-
ral disasters. In a period in which the rhetoric of the “knowledge-based 
society” has become dominant (cf. Jessop 2008), Abe seems to underline 
the importance of aid in creating knowledge and innovation. On the other 
hand, he seems to appeal his audience to beware of donors that, contrary 
to Japan, are not keen on creating quality and keep the distance from 
their recipient. PM Abe make use of powerful images of Japanese offi-
cials working side by side local engineers on ODA projects. In this way, 
he reinvigorates one of the features of Japanese ODA: the heart-to-heart 
Zappa. Help the Poor, Help Ourselves 427
Annali di Ca’ Foscari. Serie orientale, 54, 2018, 407-432
e-ISSN 2385-3042 
ISSN 1125-3789
cooperation. The stress on concepts like the “togetherness” of Japan and 
Asia, and vice-versa, the “Asianness” of Japan, is particularly telling of the 
attempt that the GOJ is willing to make in order to build positive relations 
with governments across Asia in a period of diplomatic competition with 
other regional powers like China.
4 Conclusion
In this article, the intellectual evolution of Japanese ODA has been analysed. 
In the first section, the intellectual evolution of Japanese ODA has been put 
in the context of changes at a broader level, namely the field of international 
aid. After Japan was devastated in World War II, the country received loans 
for the reconstruction from the US and the WB. In 1954, Japan agreed to 
disburse war reparations to countries in Asia. In the GOJ official discourse, 
the decision was taken based on the perception of a duty to repay the inter-
national community for the assistance received in the early postwar.
More practical and immediate necessities were however playing a cru-
cial role: Japan needed to ensure a sufficient supply of raw materials for 
its industries, and, to do this, it needed to restore its national image, at a 
time when all over Asia the dreadful memories of the Japanese wartime 
aggression were still alive. In other words, Japan had to integrate into the 
new global order founded on the US-led liberal international community. 
Later on, aid has assumed different connotations: most importantly in the 
1970s the Japanese leadership came to see it as a strategical tool to ensure 
comprehensive national security. A dichotomy is here visible: on the one 
hand, aid was an instrument through which Japan declared its affiliation 
to the US-Western bloc. On the other, given the constraints of the postwar 
constitution on the dispatch of troops outside the country, it saw in aid a 
means to protect its interests abroad and advance its political status in 
the international arena. A turning point happened at the end of the 1980s 
when Japan emerged as the world’s number one aid donor. The retreat of 
the US whose policymakers started attaching less importance to aid as a 
diplomatic tool in the wake of the fall of the Soviet Union was crucial in 
Japan’s rise. Japanese aid-giving policies attracted much more attention 
than before and were often criticised for their ‘mercantilist’ orientation. 
According to some authors, peer pressure, especially in the 1990s and 
early 2000s, was a decisive factor contributing to change. At the same 
time, the arrival of catalyst figures such as Ogata Sadako in decision-
making positions in the Japanese aid giving institutional chain has accel-
erated the process of reform and the integration of ‘new’ ideas into the 
official discourse on ODA. If on the one hand the liberal/humanitarian idea 
has contributed to the formation of the contemporary official discourse on 
ODA in Japan, a preeminent role has been played by the bureaucratic/con-
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servative idea. The emergence of conservative intellectual entrepreneurs 
as PM Abe Shinzō has favoured a periodical reassessment of the idea of 
national interest over international affiliation. As a result, the two ideas, 
apparently conflicting, appears to be juxtaposed in the official discourse. 
In conclusion, it might be said that this juxtaposition enables policymakers 
to promote one idea without totally renouncing the other, therefore, at-
tracting a larger consensus – in the case of foreign aid both at the domestic 
and at the external level) – toward their action.
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